David Dolejší
David Dolejší
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Feudal bargain in Prague: The rise, spread, and fall of craft guilds
Craft guilds were created as a response to certain problems associated with raising royal revenues and securing basic public services in Prague during the medieval and early modern periods. The theory consistent with historical evidence predicts that the rise, spread, and fall of guilds was a result of mutually beneficial bargaining between local craftsmen and their feudal rulers. Guilds enabled craftsmen to utilize the benefits of collusion by offering their capacities to sovereign authorities in exchange for exclusive market privileges. Nevertheless, they created social distortions within their industries in the process.
David Dolejší, Ph.D.
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DOI
PMH32 The Economic Burden of Alcohol Consumption in the Czech Republic
The objective of the study was to assess the societal cost of alcohol consumption in the Czech Republic in 2016 and open the public debate about alcohol harmfulness and its costs. Although alcohol is readily available and widely tolerated in the CZ, society is not able to resolve all the negative consequences of consumption and fulfill unmet needs in the treatment of alcohol-dependent patients.
Katerina Chadimova
,
Tomas Mlcoch
,
Tomas Dolezal
,
David Dolejší, Ph.D.
,
Barbora Hajickova
,
Martina Mazalova
,
Klara Lamblova
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Poster
DOI
Craft Guilds
Craft guilds were formal professional organizations in medieval and early modern Europe that operated in specific areas of industrial production. The primary objective of these organizations was to protect interests of their members. To achieve this goal, craft guilds engaged in a variety of activities from which obtaining legal monopolies over local production and trade within their crafts was the most important.
David Dolejší, Ph.D.
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Coproduction of property rights: The management of watercourses in pre-modern Bohemia
The structure of ownership is recognized as a key factor for economic and social development. The traditional approach suggests that new property rights emerge when it becomes profitable to invest in their production. I extend this idea by arguing that simply defining new property rules is not enough for new rights to develop effectively, and that enforcement of those rules is just as important. Identifying and implementing an optimal combination of definition and enforcement activities then becomes the central issue in the development of property rights. I illustrate the application of this theory with a detailed study of the evolution of water rights in pre-modern Bohemia.
David Dolejší, Ph.D.
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